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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND OFFICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX IN 
AFRICA  
 
August 2013 
 
 
Christina R. Tamer, B.S., University of Massachusetts Boston 
M.B.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
 
Directed by Associate Dean Arthur Goldsmith 
 
 
Africa is a changing continent. Although it is home to some of the world’s most 
impoverished nations, over the last ten years Africa has seen tremendous economic 
growth and many organizations contributing to this change. International development 
organizations and governments alike are seeking the best ways in which to accelerate 
these accomplishments to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. As such, this 
study seeks to update the literature on the effects that two of the largest foreign funding 
mechanisms have on the development of the continent. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows to the continent reached $42 billion dollars in 2011, while official development 
assistance (ODA) amounted to approximately $50 billion. FDI, however, has seen rapid 
growth since the early 2000s, while ODA has been climbing slowly since post-World 
War II. 
 v 
 
The study examines the effect that both FDI and ODA have on the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index. It finds significant differences 
between Low-income countries in Africa and Lower-middle, Upper-middle, or High 
income countries in Africa, as classified by the World Bank. In Low-income countries, 
ODA has a negative effect on the HDI, while FDI has an ambiguous effect. On the other 
hand, in Lower-middle, Upper-middle, or High income countries, FDI has a positive and 
significant impact on the HDI, while ODA’s impact is negative. The results indicate that 
FDI has been more effective in achieving development, while Low-income countries 
require internal changes to benefit more from foreign capital of any type.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Africa is a rapidly changing continent. Home to some of the globe’s fastest 
growing economies, the youngest population, and a booming private sector, much of the 
literature and statistics on Africa have become outdated in the last decade. Annually, 
almost $100 billion dollars flow in to the continent from foreign governments or 
investors in the form of Official Development Assistance and Aid (ODA) and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).  
ODA “consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of 
repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-
DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories 
in the DAC list of ODA recipients,” (World Bank, 2013). ODA consists of three types of 
capital: grants, concessional loans, and contributions to multilateral institutions including 
the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional 
development banks (Soubbotina, 2000).  
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“Official aid alone will not be adequate for funding efforts to accelerate economic 
growth and poverty alleviation and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 
Africa,” (Ratha, Mohaptra, and Plaza, 2008, p. 2). As such, this study includes FDI as a 
primary independent variable in addition to ODA. Much of the literature indicates that it 
will be an important resource for Africa in order to meet development goals. This is 
explored further in the literature review.  
FDI “are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest 
(10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments,” (World Bank, 
2013). FDI has grown on average 17% per year over the last 10 years, even when 
accounting for dramatic decline after the Global Financial Crisis. ODA, on the other 
hand, has grown at about 10% per year over the last 10 years. FDI is becoming a more 
popular and more common source of foreign capital for African governments.  
With the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to halve 
poverty drawing near the 2015 deadline, non-governmental organizations, development 
banks, development institutions, and governments are seeking to diversify their capital 
offerings and optimize them for results. As such, it’s pertinent to understand the impact 
both FDI and ODA have on development and poverty alleviation in the African context, 
where over 400 million people continue to live in extreme poverty despite recent 
economic advances.  
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The goal of the study is to better understand the impact of each capital source and 
improve the decision-making of investors, development agencies, multilateral 
institutions, and other programs focused on providing capital to African nations. In the 
case of development agencies and other mission-driven organizations, improved 
decision-making for funding can create more successful program outcomes. For 
investors, improved decision-making can help companies enjoy the benefits of 
profitability and positive stakeholder impact. Furthermore, the results will also provide 
insight for African governments seeking to better understand what internal factors can 
increase the nation’s ability to reap any benefits associated with FDI and ODA inflows.  
The research questions are: 
1. Does FDI increase development in Africa? 
2. Does ODA increase development in Africa? 
3. Are there differences in development outcomes based on national income 
classifications?  
For the purposes of this study, poverty alleviation is synonymous with increases 
in development, both economic and human. These questions seek to understand the 
effects of FDI and ODA’s impact on poverty alleviation and development increases, as 
measured by changes in the United Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite, “single statistic which serves as a 
frame of reference for both social and economic development,” according to the UNDP. 
It is a “new way of measuring development by combining indicators of life expectancy, 
educational attainment and income,” (United Nations Development Programme, 2011).  
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The study uses the UNDP’s measurement of HDI as a proxy for development for 
many reasons. There have been previous studies on FDI and ODA’s effects on 
development in Africa, but few have used the HDI. A study by Bezuidenhout (2009) 
analyzed the impact of FDI and ODA on development, but used GDP growth as a proxy. 
Due to income disparity, this is likely an unsuitable reflection of development in Africa, 
especially at the bottom of the economic pyramid. Bezuidenhout did not find significant 
results with regard to ODA’s impact on GDP growth, but found that FDI has a negative 
impact on GDP growth (2009).  
Masud and Yontcheva studied the effects of ODA in 2005, but used literacy and 
infant mortality as dependent variables. They found that ODA, when separated as NGO 
aid, reduces infant mortality (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). Their results on ODA’s 
impact on illiteracy were inconclusive. This does not provide enough insight in order to 
make a conclusive statement on ODA’s impact on development. Further, the analysis was 
not exclusive to Africa.  
The HDI, which captures quality of life, access to knowledge, and the standard of 
living, is an improved composite measure for all three of the dependent variables used by 
Bezuidenhout (2009) and Masud and Yontcheva (2005). The study conducted by Gohou 
and Soumaré was the first to use the UNDP’s HDI as the dependent variable, however 
they did not include ODA data (2011). This thesis seeks to build on each of these by 
using FDI, ODA, and HDI data by contributing new findings to the literature.  
This thesis addresses the following research question:  Do FDI and ODA increase 
development in Africa, and how does the influence vary by national income 
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classification? The analysis tests the effects of the independent variables – FDI and ODA 
– on the dependent variable, a composite measure of development status, the UNDP’s 
HDI. The thesis progresses with a detailed review of the relevant literature on FDI and 
ODA in the African context as well as reasoning for using the HDI.  A description of the 
method and sample follows. Finally, a presentation of the results precedes the discussion 
of implications for practice, along with limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Africa: A Changing Continent   
In the past, researchers have analyzed the effects of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) independently on poverty reduction. 
Few focus specifically on Africa, a continent that “remains underresearched” (Asiedu, 
2004). Due to the speed at which the continent is growing and changing economically, 
any existing research regarding development has become outdated over the last five to 
ten years. For this reason, the study focuses specifically on FDI and ODA’s impact on 
development and poverty alleviation in Africa alone.  
The continent as a whole has experienced astounding GDP growth rates: “a third 
of countries in the region will be growing at or above six percent,” (Chuhan-Pole, 
Angwafo, Buitano, Dennis, Korman, and Sanoh, 2012). The International Monetary Fund 
predicts that African nations will claim seven of the ten fastest growing economies 
throughout the next decade (The Economist, 2011). 
In addition to unprecedented economic growth, there are trends in culture and 
business that affect the way the continent receives and uses foreign capital. Globalization, 
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privatization, and the liberalization of trade are trends in business that have dramatically 
increased the flow of FDI into the continent (Asiedu, 2004). An exceptional example is 
the rapid growth of the information and communication technology sector, largely due to 
the privatization of the industry. Since 2002, mobile phones per 100 inhabitants in Africa 
have increased from two to almost sixty by 2011 (World Bank, 2013).  
The population is not only growing, but also shifting. By 2040, there will be 1.1 
billion Africans of working age and 50% of the total population will be living in cities by 
2030 (Roxburg, Dörr, Leke, Tazi-Riffi, van Wamelen, Lund, Chironga, Alatovik, Atkins, 
Terfous, Zeino-Mahmalat, 2010). As citizens move out of rural areas and away from 
agrarian lifestyles, employment in the industry and service sectors will rise and likely 
propel many families to middle class status.  
The growing middle class market segment represents a potential spending power 
of $1.4 trillion by 2020, up from $860 billion in 2008 (Roxburg, et al., 2010), piquing 
global interest in both public and private sectors. Telecommunications companies and 
consumer packaged goods retailers are eager to compete for a sizable portion of the 
potential market.  Famously, Nokia and Coca-Cola are two of the best-recognized brands 
on the continent (Ledgard, 2011).  Global consumer packed goods companies like 
Nielsen and IRI are competing to get a share of the consumer data and are investing 
heavily to do so.  
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Looking Ahead  
Many global organizations are prioritizing poverty alleviation in Africa over the 
next decade. In 2001, the United Nations announced the Millennium Development Goals, 
which galvanize “unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world’s poorest,” 
(United Nations, 2001) with a set of eight time bound targets. The targets include the 
reduction of “poverty, hunger, disease, and lack of adequate shelter and exclusion – while 
promoting gender equality, health, education, and environmental sustainability,” (United 
Nations, 2001). They are unlike any previous efforts to meet the needs of the world’s 
poorest citizens and combine resources to do so effectively. The overarching goal is to: 
“Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a 
day,” (United Nations, 2001).  
African leaders banded together in 2001 to launch NEPAD, the New Partnership 
for African Development, “to pursue new priorities’ and approaches to the political and 
socio-economic transformation of Africa,” (NEPAD, 2001; Asiedu, 2004). One of the 
primary objectives of NEPAD is to promote the private sector and foreign direct 
investment.  
With these ambitious goals and initiatives laid out for the next decade, policy 
makers, investors, and donors are still speculating on what capital sources will have the 
biggest impact in Africa. In fact, much of the literature presents conflicting findings on 
the impact of various capital sources on African development. This research will focus on 
the impact of FDI and ODA on human development. These two capital sources are the 
main forms of financial flows to developing countries (Soubbotina, 2000).  
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Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance in Africa 
 For many decades, ODA was the primary source of capital that development 
agencies provided to developing countries. However, there has been a lack of obvious 
progress along with strong scrutiny of the use and management of aid dollars. Therefore, 
development agencies are looking to diversify how their dollars are spent, especially in 
Africa. National development aid organizations, as well as non-governmental 
organizations and multilateral organizations, are reconsidering traditional aid and 
development assistance and are diversifying their capital offerings, particularly with 
investment in the private sector. For example, members of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, such as the Multilateral Investment Fund and the Inter-American 
Investment Group, have been established to make direct equity investments in private 
business (Inter-American Development Bank, 2013).  
In addition to the desire for diversification, an overall increase in capital is needed 
for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals to be feasible. In order to 
halve poverty in Africa, NEPAD predicts that 7% annual growth in the region’s GDP is 
required from 2001. Unfortunately, despite some impressive economic growth in some 
individual nations, the region as a whole is not growing fast enough. As such, there is a 
resource gap of 12% of the continent’s GDP, about $64 billion, that is preventing the 
possibility of halving poverty by 2015 (NEPAD, 2001). It is predicted that much of that 
resource gap will be filled with foreign direct investment capital flows (Asiedu, 2004).  
FDI brings many benefits, and due to its increasing presence in the African 
economy, will be a key player in Africa’s economic growth. On the other hand, ODA, 
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popular since the 1970s, has slowly climbed over the past four decades but now risks 
being outpaced by FDI permanently. See Figure 1 to compare the growth of the capital 
flows since 1970. 
Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance and Aid to 
Africa, 1970-2011  
 
Official Development Assistance 
ODA has been the “main source of external financing for developing countries” 
since World War II (Soubbotina, 2000). For context, it’s important to note that grants 
make up the majority of aid capital flows (Soubbotina, 2000). This capital source 
represents the contributions of public governments around the world to developing 
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countries. ODA inflows to Africa have been increasing slowly, almost reaching $50 
billion in 2010 (World Bank, 2013).  
Aid dollars are subject to scrutiny due to the reputation for corruption in recipient 
countries. Some say that ODA has largely been ineffective and has left billions remaining 
in abject poverty. The misallocation and misuse of development assistance funds is often 
the culprit. In recent decades, tying arrangements were introduced to prevent 
mismanagement. Tying arrangements are sets of conditions, such as those that require 
“recipients to purchase goods and services from the donor country or from a specific 
group of countries,” (Soubotina, 2000). However, this “may reduce the value of aid if the 
arrangements are motivated by a desire to benefit suppliers of certain countries and that 
may prevent recipients from buying at the lowest price,” (Soubbotina, 2000).  
With a large number of caveats tied to ODA inflows, its effectiveness has been 
the topic of a number of studies. The literature finds conflicting evidence on the 
macroeconomic impact of ODA on economic and human development, and the literature 
is further muddied by the employment of different measurements for development gains 
or poverty reduction.  
For example, the IMF published a study on the effects of official development 
assistance on infant mortality and literacy as proxies for human development (Masud and 
Yontcheva, 2005). Masud and Yontcheva found that ODA has no significant impact on 
gains in literacy, while some forms of segmented ODA reduce infant mortality in 
developing countries around the world (2005). On the other hand, Alvi and Senveta 
(2011) studied developing countries in different regions and found that “foreign aid is 
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associated with a decline in poverty as measured by the poverty rate.” Unfortunately, 
poverty rate data are inconsistently available and are arguably a subjective measure. 
Meanwhile, Bezuidenhout found that ODA has no impact on GDP growth in Southern 
Africa (2009). A similar issue exists in the literature concerning FDI, which is discussed 
in the following section.  
Foreign Direct Investment  
 Many agree that FDI will be crucial to the development of the African region. It 
“serves as a source of capital, stimulates domestic investment, creates employment, 
promotes the transfer of technology and enhances economic growth,” (Asiedu, 2004). 
NEPAD considers FDI “an essential component of a sustainable long-term approach to 
filling the resource gap,” (2001). Given the rapid rate of change and growth in Africa, 
there is a lot of promise for the continued increase of FDI. As mentioned before, the 
private sector is becoming increasingly interested in this new, multi-billion dollar market.  
The data shows that FDI net inflows to Africa have doubled in the last five years. 
They are unlikely to slow down. It is important to note that there is an emerging trend 
that bodes well for an increase in net inflows of FDI to Africa. Investors, including 
development finance institutions and high-net worth individuals, are turning to market-
based solutions on the principle that decades of donor aid has still left billions of people 
in abject poverty. J.P. Morgan deems “impact investing” to be “a new asset class,” 
focused on both social and financial returns. Impact investing contributes to the inward 
flow of foreign direct investment.  J.P Morgan predicts that institutional and individual 
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investors will contribute 5-10% of their investment portfolios to impact investments over 
the next decade, (Saltuk, Bouri, and Leung, 2011). Within impact investing, Africa is the 
second largest recipient market, behind the United States (Saltuk, Bouri, and Leung, 
2011).  
However, just as with ODA, the research on the effectiveness of FDI is 
conflicting, frequently finding that certain conditions are necessary in order to allow 
effectiveness. Gohou and Soumaré found that FDI positively impacts development as 
measured by the HDI and as GDP per capita in Africa (2011). Bezuidenhout’s results 
show the opposite: that FDI has a negative impact on growth in Southern Africa (2009). 
Lensink and Morrisey’s results showed that FDI has a negative impact on GDP per capita 
growth, but the results were not robust nor did they focus exclusively on Africa (2006).  
Measuring Development: Human Development Index 
This study, as those before it, examines effects that FDI and ODA have on 
poverty reduction and development gains. However, many previous studies are 
conflicting in their measurements of development, and few have looked at ODA and FDI 
together in the pan-African context.  
Some studies have examined the effects of capital on GDP growth. While a 
growing GDP per capita is a positive sign, it indicates economic growth rather than 
development and the achievement of poverty alleviation. The poverty headcount seems to 
be a logical substitute; however the data are few and prevent a robust study. Human 
development indicators are a better measure of the impact of the capital sources on 
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poverty, but employing them separately can lead to conflicting results (Masud and 
Yontcheva, 2005).  
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic designed by the 
United Nations Development Programme to measure the social and economic 
development of a country based on life expectancy, educational attainment, and income 
(UNDP, 2012). “The HDI sets a minimum and maximum for each dimension, called 
goalposts, and then shows where each country stands in relation to these goalposts, 
expressed as a value between 0 and 1,” (UNDP, 2012). The statistic reflects GDP per 
capita, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rates, and the combined gross educational 
enrollment ratio at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (UNDP, 2012). It’s a 
statistic that is widely accessible and captures development beyond narrow economics.  
Building on Previous Work 
 As described above, there are many studies that examine the effectiveness of 
ODA and FDI. The results of previous work are largely inconclusive and often carry a 
number of stipulations dependent on data. There are many studies on the effects of FDI 
and ODA on developing economies around the world, but very few that focus on the 
empirical effects in Africa alone. Finally, to the best of the author’s knowledge, none 
compares both FDI and ODA in the context of the Human Development Index.  
The key takeaway from this research will be recommendations for those looking 
to deploy capital to emerging African countries. Currently, there is no side-by-side 
comparison of the macroeconomic effects of FDI and ODA in Africa. This research will 
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close that gap and provide conclusions for the effectiveness of both public and private 
sector funding solutions that promote economic development. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The World Bank’s African Development Indicators, the Human Development 
Report of the UNDP, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the 
Freedom House are the main data sources for this research to perform panel regression 
analyses.  
Sample 
The sample is an unbalanced panel data set. It includes data for 52 African 
countries for the years ranging from 1980-2011. The data are divided into two groups, 
based on the World Bank’s Income Classification Rankings as of June 30, 2012. Due to 
the lower levels of development on the African continent, the countries are split into two 
groups in order to maintain significance in the data. Twenty-six of the countries in the 
sample are classified as Low-income, meaning that Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita is $1,025 or less as of 2012. The remaining portion of the sample are Lower-
middle-income, Upper-middle income, and in the case of Equatorial Guinea, High 
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income, all with GNI per capita of $1,206 or greater as of 2012 (World Bank, 2012). 
Table 1 shows each of the countries in the sample.  
Table 1: Countries in the Sample, Shown by World Bank Income Group as of 2012 
Group 1  
(GNI per capita $1,025 or less) 
Group 2  
(GNI per capita $1,026 or greater) 
Country 
World Bank 
Income Group 
(2012) Country 
World Bank 
Income Group 
(2012) 
Benin Low Cameroon Lower-middle 
Burkina Faso Low Cape Verde Lower-middle 
Burundi Low Congo, Rep. Lower-middle 
Central African Republic Low Cote d'Ivoire Lower-middle 
Chad Low Dijbouti Lower-middle 
Comoros Low Egypt, Arab Rep. Lower-middle 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Low Ghana Lower-middle 
Eritrea Low Lesotho Lower-middle 
Ethiopia Low Morocco Lower-middle 
The Gambia Low Nigeria Lower-middle 
Guinea Low Sao Tome & Principe Lower-middle 
Guinea-Bissau Low Senegal Lower-middle 
Kenya Low Sudan Lower-middle 
Liberia Low Swaziland Lower-middle 
Madagascar Low Zambia Lower-middle 
Malawi Low Algeria Upper-middle 
Mali Low Angola Upper-middle 
Mauritania Low Botswana Upper-middle 
Mozambique Low Gabon Upper-middle 
Niger Low Libya Upper-middle 
Rwanda Low Mauritius Upper-middle 
Sierra Leone Low Namibia Upper-middle 
Tanzania Low Seychelles Upper-middle 
Togo Low South Africa Upper-middle 
Uganda Low Tunisia Upper-middle 
Zimbabwe Low Equatorial Guinea High 
N.B. South Sudan and Somalia have been omitted due to insufficient data. 
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Table 2: Variable abbreviations, descriptions, and data sources 
Variable 
Abbreviation 
 
Variable Description  Data Source  
Dependent Variable 
hdi Human Development Index  United Nations 
Development Program  
Independent Variables 
fdi Foreign Direct Investment in current 
USD at current exchange rates 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development  
pop Country population, total World Bank African 
Development Indicators 
fdipop Calculated by dividing fdi by the 
respective population 
Calculated with UNCTAD 
and World Bank data 
aid Net official development assistance 
and official aid received (current US$) 
World Bank African 
Development Indicators  
aidpop Calculated by dividing aid by the 
respective population 
Calculated with World Bank 
data   
fdigdp FDI calculated as a ratio of GDP 
(current USD)  
Calculated with UNCTAD 
and World Bank data 
aidgdp Aid calculated as a ratio of GDP 
(current USD) 
Calculated with World Bank 
data 
Control Variables 
debtgdp Debt outstanding and disbursed, Total 
to GDP (% of GDP) 
World Bank African 
Development Indicators 
govspend General government final 
consumption expenditure/GDP (both 
current US) 
World Bank African 
Development Indicators 
inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) World Bank African 
Development Indicators 
phone Fixed and mobile subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 
World Bank African 
Development Indicators 
open Imports + Exports / GDP  World Bank African 
Development Indicators 
credit Domestic credit to private sector (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank African 
Development Indicators 
pr Political rights Freedom House 
cl  Civil liberties Freedom House  
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Table 2 describes each of the variables, including the data source or how it was 
calculated as well as the abbreviation used for each. 
Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable employed in this study is the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI). As mentioned above, it is a composite statistic developed by 
the UNDP to capture the income, life expectancy, and educational attainment of 
individual nations. Poverty incidence data is not used due to the low number of 
observations available from the World Bank. By employing a lag on the HDI variable, 
the results show the effect that FDI and ODA in their various forms have over time. It is 
reasonable to expect that impact would not be reflected in the data in the same year that 
the capital entered the respective country. 
Independent Variables 
 To accurately capture the effects of FDI and ODA on the HDI, two different 
variables are employed for each: 
• FDI flows per capita 
• FDI as a percentage of GDP 
• ODA flows per capita  
• ODA as a percentage of GDP 
This is consistent with the methodology used in previous literature.  
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Control Variables 
 While inflows of FDI and ODA create an impact on an individual nation’s 
economy, there are several other factors that impact HDI. Using control variables in a 
multiple regression analysis will reduce the risk for omitted variable bias and provide 
more accurate insight into the effects that FDI and ODA have on national development.  
First, individual national economies have a significant impact on the welfare of 
the people. To control for this, the regression includes the following economic and policy 
variables. As specified by Gohou and Soumaré, “citizens’ basic needs are principally 
ensured by government spending,” (2011). This is captured in the variable for 
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (“govspend”) and it is expected that this 
capital source will positively impact the HDI. On the contrary, the ratio of national debt 
as a percentage of GDP (“debtgdp”) is expected to have a negative impact on welfare as 
high levels of debt constrain internal spending. Inflation is also used to capture volatility, 
and it is expected that high levels of inflation will negatively impact the HDI.    
In addition, good infrastructure generally improves national welfare and living 
conditions. The best-known change in African infrastructure over the last decade has 
been the massive surge in mobile phone subscribers. To control for infrastructure gains, 
the study employs a variable for the log of mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
(“logphone”), which is expected to positively impact the HDI. Although kilometers of 
paved roads per 100 inhabitants and internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants capture 
infrastructure, a single infrastructure variable is used to avoid high levels of correlation.  
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In addition, regardless of the nominal amount of FDI and ODA inflows, there are 
certain factors that will either inhibit or assist the effective use of the capital, particularly 
for FDI. These business environment variables include: openness to trade (“open”), 
measured by imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, and domestic credit available 
to the private sector (“credit”). The analysis should show that these positively impact the 
HDI as they evidence a sound business environment and would allow capital, particularly 
FDI, to be effective.  
Finally, it’s important to control for the unique and volatile political and civil 
environments in Africa. For each capital source, political risk will have a significant 
impact on the effectiveness of increasing development. To control for this, the study 
employs two measures developed to capture political rights (“pr”) and civil liberties 
(“cl”). These data are developed by the Freedom House, which evaluates the state of 
global freedom. These data are rankings on a scale of 1 to 7, where “1 indicates the 
highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom,” (Freedom House, 2012). 
Higher degrees of freedom should positively impact the HDI.  
Summary Statistics  
Table 3 shows the key summary statistics for the data set, representing the years 
1980-2011 and 52 African nations.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Development 
lag_hdi 1091 0.4168248 0.1281429 0.174 0.775 
Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance 
fdi 1141 4.00E+08 1.09E+09 -5.59E+09 1.16E+10 
aid 1084 5.06E+08 7.14E+08 5270000 1.14E+10 
pop 1092 1.46E+07 1.87E+07 81131 1.58E+08 
fdipop 1090 57.96561 202.0703 0 2806.03 
aidpop 1084 53.94953 58.759 1.3438 688.7694 
fdigdp 1137 0.0382084 0.0740683 
-
0.0553077 0.9100733 
aidgdp 1082 0.1090342 0.1233403 0.0002703 1.470542 
Controls 
debtgdp 1090 0.850031 1.124573 0.0303205 18.23434 
govspend 1053 0.1531498 0.0642828 0.0204712 0.4595933 
inflation 1139 49.13981 814.0862 -33.78553 26762.02 
phone 1073 14.23219 26.33785 0.0388188 190.8432 
logphone 1073 0.9419391 2.040673 -3.248852 5.251452 
open 1084 0.7349987 0.3655485 0.0632034 2.453525 
credit 1045 21.14307 21.60811 0.6827951 161.9804 
pr 1141 4.767748 1.79777 1 7 
cl 1141 4.531113 1.423378 1 7 
 
In addition, correlation data will indicate the strength of the regression models. The 
correlation table follows. 
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Method 
To study the impact of both FDI and ODA on development, as measured by the 
Human Development Index, the analysis employs the following panel regression:  𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  ∝   +  𝛽!"#$%&'  !"#$%&  !"#$%&'$"&   + 𝛽!""#$#%&  !"#"$%&'"()  !""#"$%&'(   + 𝛽!"#$%"&' + 𝑢 
In this case, development is represented by the HDI on a lag, as it is reasonable to assume 
that it will take time for the capital sources to take effect. FDI and ODA are measured in 
two ways. First, they are measured per capita; in other words, the amount of capital 
inflow into the respective nation as divided by its total population. Secondly, the capital 
sources will be measured by dividing the respective nation’s GDP.  Finally, the controls 
refer to the control variables listed in Table 2.  
The analysis employs the specified model for Africa as a whole, and then further 
investigates the impact of the capital sources by looking at Low-income countries and 
Middle-income or higher countries separately. By breaking the African nations into two 
groups, the results will demonstrate the effects that each capital source has in nations 
with varying levels of economic development.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to understand the difference in effectiveness 
that ODA and FDI have in increasing the UNDP’s HDI. The first analysis studies the 
African continent as a whole and the results are summarized in Table 5. The results show 
that ODA calculated as ODA per capita (“aidpop)” has a negative impact, significant at 
the 0.1% level when including control variables. Using ODA as a percentage of GDP 
(“aidgdp”) shows that the capital has a negative impact on the HDI, a finding that is 
significant at the 0.1% level, both with and without controls. This adds to the robustness 
of the finding.  
The study of FDI, however, is not as robust for Africa as a whole. The analysis 
shows that FDI per capita (“fdipop”) has a positive impact on the HDI, with and without 
controls. However, the ratio of FDI to GDP (“fdigdp”) shows inconclusive results due to 
inconsistency. FDI as a percentage of GDP has a positive impact on the HDI when 
excluding control variables, but is negative when including controls. For this reason, it is 
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pertinent to conduct further analysis by separating the sample by income classification, 
and the summary of these results are shown in Table 6.  
Table 5: Panel regression results for FDI and ODA’s impact on the HDI (1-year lag) in 
Africa, 1980-2011 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi 
  
   
  
fdipop 0.000215*** 
 
0.000123***   
  (11.53) 
 
(6.15)   
aidpop 0.000110 
 
-0.000218***   
  (1.69) 
 
(-4.22)   
fdigdp 
 
0.181*** 
 
-0.218*** 
  
 
(3.91) 
 
(-3.90) 
aidgdp 
 
-0.509*** 
 
-0.310*** 
  
 
(-18.28) 
 
(-14.26) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0241*** 0.0000829 
  
  
(-5.31) (0.02) 
govspend 
  
0.0775 0.0657 
  
  
(1.53) (1.46) 
inflation 
  
0.0000295 0.00000727 
  
  
(0.92) (0.25) 
logphone 
  
0.0252*** 0.0261*** 
  
  
(14.60) (16.40) 
cl 
  
-0.0129** -0.00987** 
  
  
(-3.17) (-2.69) 
pr 
  
0.00916** 0.00518 
  
  
(3.02) (1.89) 
open 
  
0.0857*** 0.105*** 
  
  
(8.96) (12.49) 
credit 
  
0.00159*** 0.00129*** 
  
  
(11.98) (10.63) 
_cons 0.395*** 0.462*** 0.322*** 0.337*** 
  (78.82) (97.48) (22.60) (26.25) 
  
   
  
N 1032 1030 886 886 
See Table 2 for abbreviations.   
t statistics in parentheses 
   * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Summary of panel regression results for FDI and ODA’s impact on the HDI in 
Low-income Africa and Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income Africa.  
    ODA FDI 
    odapop odagdp fdipop fdigdp 
Lo
w 
Sign negative negative positive inconclusive 
Significance 0.10% 0.10% 1% 0 
Controls with with and without without neither 
M
id
dl
e+
 
Sign negative negative positive positive 
Significance 5% 0.10% 0.10% 1% 
Controls with with and without with and without without 
Note: See full results in Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix A. 
Low-income Countries in Africa  
 Low-income countries in Africa, as classified by the World Bank, include those 
with $1,205 or less in GNI per capita as of 2012. The full results are shown in Table 7 in 
Appendix A. The analysis of the Low-income countries shows that ODA has a 
significant, negative impact on the HDI. ODA as a percentage of GDP (“aidgdp”) shows 
a negative impact both with and without controls, significant at the 0.1% level. ODA per 
capita (“aidpop”) show a negative impact when including control variables, also 
significant at the 0.1% level.  
However, the results for FDI’s impact on Low-income countries are insignificant 
and inconclusive. The exception is the regression of FDI per capita (“fdipop”) on the HDI 
without controls, which shows a positive impact, significant at the 1% level. However, 
this finding is not robust enough to make a strong conclusion on FDI’s impact on Low-
income countries.  
 28 
It is important to note, however, that the control variables provide useful insight. 
In particular, national indebtedness (measured as the ratio of the country’s debt to its 
GDP [“debtgdp”]) has a negative impact on the HDI. Further, the national level of civil 
liberties, the Freedom House measure of citizens’ freedom of expression and belief, 
negatively impacts the HDI. On the other hand, if a nation is more open and to trade 
(“open”) and provides credit to the private sector (“credit”), we see a positive impact on 
the HDI.   
Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High Income Countries in Africa  
 The second segment of the sample includes countries that the World Bank had 
designated as Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income countries in Africa as of 
2012. According to the World Bank’s classification categories, these countries have a 
GNI per capita of $1,206 or greater as of 2012. Table 8 in Appendix A shows full results 
for this analysis.   
Unlike the previous analysis for the Low-income countries, there are robust 
results of FDI’s impact on the HDI in Middle to High income countries. The analysis 
shows that FDI per capita (“fdipop”) has a positive impact on HDI, both with and without 
controls, and it is significant at the 0.1% level. To add to the robustness of the finding, 
FDI as a percentage of GDP (“fdigdp”) also has a positive impact on HDI, albeit without 
controls variables. This finding is significant at the 1% level.  
Similar to the finding for Africa as a whole and in Low-income countries, ODA 
has a negative impact on HDI. ODA per capita (“aidpop”) has a negative impact on the 
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HDI, significant at the 5% level. ODA as a percentage of GDP (“aidgdp”) shows a very 
robust, negative impact on the HDI, both with and without controls. Each of the findings 
is significant at the 0.1% level.   
As with the findings for Low-income countries, national indebtedness negatively 
impacts the HDI, while openness to trade and availability of credit to the private sector 
positively impact the HDI.   
Other results  
The analysis called for a variety of different tests and experimentation with 
different lags on the dependent variable. The results in this section are based on the 
sample including all African countries for which data were available. Tests were 
conducted dropping North African countries and oil-exporting countries, but dropping 
these countries did not impact the outcome and the results are omitted from the following 
section. The regressions employ a one-year lag on the dependent variable. A five-year lag 
was also used, but this did not change the significance or outcome of the results. The 
results of the analysis using a five-year lag are shown in Tables 11, 12, and 13 in 
Appendix A. Finally, it is interesting to note that the results do not change significantly 
when only including FDI or ODA variables. That is to say, the success is of each capital 
source is not affected by the other. These results are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 in 
Appendix A.  
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Note on reverse causality of ODA and the HDI 
The results clearly show that ODA has a negative impact on the HDI, but there is 
a question of reverse causality. Many assume that ODA levels are high in the Low-
income segment of Africa because the HDI is low. Due to this concern, the analysis 
employed two different measurements of ODA: on a per capita basis and as a percentage 
of GDP. On comparing the means of these two variables between the Low-income 
countries sample and the Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income countries 
sample, it’s clear that ODA contributes to a higher percentage of GDP for the former. 
Interestingly, however, the “richer” segment of the sample has a higher level of ODA per 
capita than the Low-income segment. Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix B show the two sets 
of summary statistics and how they vary.  
 Further, the results show that regardless of the level of ODA, whether per capita 
or as a percentage of GDP, ODA has a negative impact in both Low-income Africa and 
in Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income Africa. ODA, whether in large or 
small quantities, does not improve the HDI in Africa, regardless of national income level. 
For perspective, ODA accounts for higher portions of national GDP than FDI in both 
segments. Although the latter segment is “richer,” it’s important to keep in mind that it is 
still among the world’s poorest countries with few exceptions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results provide interesting insight into the effects that FDI and ODA have had 
on the HDI, and the difference across national income level classifications. The results 
for Africa alone provide evidence that FDI is more effective than ODA in increasing 
development. In order to gain deeper insight into how the capital sources affect African 
development, the split between Low-income countries and those of higher development 
levels shows a noteworthy story that has strong policy implications.  
Official Development Assistance  
 Regardless of the nominal levels of ODA, the capital source creates a negative 
impact in Africa in both segments. This could be due to the “curse of aid” that many have 
referred to in the past. For example, Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol found that 
ODA has a negative impact on poor countries because of the large dependency 
governments have on the capital (2008). In this study, the Low-income countries 
displayed an average ODA as a ratio of GDP of 16%, (see Table 14 in Appendix B) and 
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it’s likely a much higher percentage of the respective government budget as well. This 
lack of diversification in the GDP is ultimately a curse.   
Foreign Direct Investment  
In general, FDI is better suited to the Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High 
income countries. It has a strong, positive impact on the HDI. It’s likely that FDI is more 
suitable to the needs of rapidly growing countries than ODA. Since FDI provides benefits 
such as increased employment and technology transfer, it has been more effective in 
countries with comparatively better economies, infrastructure, and business 
environments.   
FDI’s impact is insignificant in Low-income countries. This is attributable to 
other factors, such as national indebtedness, availability of credit, and openness to trade. 
FDI per capita is much lower in Low-income countries opposed to the higher-income 
counterparts. However, FDI as a percentage of GDP is similar in both segments. If 
Africa’s poorest nations can follow policy recommendations laid out in former research 
(Asiedu, 2004) to become more attractive to FDI, there will be potential to further 
diversify its GDP and increase FDI per capita.  
Implications for Investors, Donors, and Policy-Makers 
Low-income Countries in Africa  
The results suggest that something must change internally in order for foreign 
capital to be effective in increasing development, whether it is ODA or FDI. Because of 
the significant constraint that national indebtedness has, increasing loan forgiveness 
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could be a more effective use of ODA. Currently grants make up the majority of ODA 
(Soubottina, 2000); this study shows that current deployments of ODA are ineffective. In 
addition, implementing policies that promote globalization could help Low-income 
countries increase their openness to trade and create a better business environment and 
potentially capitalize on some of the positive impact FDI can bring.  
Lower-Middle, Upper-Middle, and High income Countries in Africa  
Although these countries represent the richer half of Africa, it’s important to keep 
relativity in perspective. In other words, there is still much work to be done in these 
nations, and this study shows that FDI has played a significant role in the HDI gains, and 
can continue to do so. As such, the recommendation for development organizations 
focusing on Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income countries in Africa is to 
focus on policy development for attracting and maintaining healthy levels of FDI. This 
includes increasing openness to trade, reducing debt, and increasing the availability of 
credit to the private sector, all of which significantly impact growth in the HDI as well.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis sought to answer the questions of FDI and ODA’s impact on poverty 
alleviation and increases in development in Africa. In short, FDI is related to 
improvements in development outcomes in Africa, but ODA is not.  FDI’s impact in 
Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income countries in Africa is positive and 
significant. Unfortunately, its impact in Low-income countries is ambiguous, but as more 
countries move up in income level classifications, it’s reasonable to assume that FDI will 
be a powerful tool in closing the resource gap required to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals. On the other hand, this study shows that ODA has become an 
ineffective tool at reducing poverty in Africa, no matter the income level.  
 The research makes two important recommendations for those deploying capital 
in Africa. Those focused on funding Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income 
countries in Africa should direct resources to FDI, including private companies, projects, 
and other programs that stimulate employment and technology transfer. On the other 
hand, those focused on funding Low-income countries should promote public debt 
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forgiveness and creating a more transparent business environment to allow for openness 
to trade as well as credit for the private sector. These internal changes will allow Low-
income countries to reach their potential in attracting and benefitting from FDI. It’s 
unlikely that ODA will be a positive force in the future given the negative impact it has 
even on the higher income countries.  
Limitations  
 The research, however, is not without limitations. First, the panel dataset is 
unbalanced, meaning that data are missing for some years. Further, the HDI, although a 
good reflection of income, knowledge, and health, does not necessarily capture income 
disparity. Finally, the types of FDI or ODA are not disaggregated by sector. A sectorial 
analysis could provide further recommendations for multilateral organizations and 
policy-makers on where to make or stimulate investments.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
In addition to compensating for the above limitations where possible, there are 
many paths for future research. First, future research should explore the implications of 
national indebtedness in both the public and private sectors. This is especially important 
as the research showed that national debt levels greatly impact development. Further, 
future researchers should explore why exactly Low-income countries are unable to reap 
the benefits of FDI. The preliminary results in this study indicate that openness to trade, 
national indebtedness, and the availability of credit impact this, but a deeper exploration 
would provide insight on how to appropriately attract and direct FDI.  
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APPENDIX A 
FULL RESULTS TABLES  
Table 7: Panel regression results for FDI and ODA’s impact on the HDI (1-year lag) in 
Low-income countries in Africa, 1980-2011 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi 
fdipop 0.000361** 
 
-0.000223   
  (3.08) 
 
(-1.63)   
aidpop 0.0000415 
 
-0.000678***   
  (0.42) 
 
(-7.35)   
fdigdp 
 
0.0638 
 
-0.0822 
  
 
(1.88) 
 
(-1.54) 
aidgdp 
 
-0.154*** 
 
-0.174*** 
  
 
(-7.11) 
 
(-9.01) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0127** -0.00320 
  
  
(-3.05) (-0.76) 
govspend 
  
0.228*** 0.213*** 
  
  
(3.99) (3.87) 
inflation 
  
0.0000116 0.00000766 
  
  
(0.51) (0.35) 
logphone 
  
0.0207*** 0.0200*** 
  
  
(11.65) (11.80) 
cl 
  
-0.0111** -0.00788* 
  
  
(-2.94) (-2.16) 
pr 
  
0.00377 0.00168 
  
  
(1.30) (0.60) 
open 
  
0.0701*** 0.0505*** 
  
  
(4.80) (3.76) 
credit 
  
0.00137*** 0.00118*** 
  
  
(4.55) (4.02) 
_cons 0.318*** 0.347*** 0.309*** 0.309*** 
  (56.59) (74.59) (23.28) (24.25) 
  
   
  
N 519 519 439 439 
See Table 2 for abbreviations.   
t statistics in parentheses 
   * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 8: Panel regression results of FDI and ODA’s impact on the HDI (1-year lag) in 
Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income countries in Africa, 1980-2011 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi 
fdipop 0.000127*** 
 
0.000121***   
  (7.90) 
 
(6.29)   
aidpop 0.0000390 
 
-0.000104*   
  (0.65) 
 
(-2.06)   
fdigdp 
 
0.257** 
 
-0.177 
  
 
(3.16) 
 
(-1.67) 
aidgdp 
 
-0.665*** 
 
-0.408*** 
  
 
(-10.61) 
 
(-7.05) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0317*** -0.00720 
  
  
(-4.41) (-0.95) 
govspend 
  
-0.0502 -0.0398 
  
  
(-0.85) (-0.68) 
inflation 
  
-0.0000249 0.000216 
  
  
(-0.13) (1.17) 
logphone 
  
0.0174*** 0.0200*** 
  
  
(7.23) (8.18) 
cl 
  
-0.0268*** -0.0224*** 
  
  
(-4.82) (-4.09) 
pr 
  
0.0174*** 0.0122** 
  
  
(4.25) (3.01) 
open 
  
0.0479*** 0.0821*** 
  
  
(4.37) (7.91) 
credit 
  
0.00103*** 0.000915*** 
  
  
(7.32) (6.55) 
_cons 0.487*** 0.531*** 0.463*** 0.448*** 
  (86.37) (87.52) (21.79) (21.60) 
  
   
  
N 513 511 447 447 
See Table 2 for abbreviations.   
t statistics in parentheses 
   * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 9: Panel regression results for FDI’s impact on the HDI (1-year lag) in Africa, 
1980-2011 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi 
     fdipop 0.000223*** 
 
0.000105*** 
 
 
(12.38) 
 
(5.33) 
 fdigdp 
 
0.0101 
 
-0.419*** 
  
(0.20) 
 
(-6.99) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0262*** -0.0199*** 
   
(-5.75) (-4.35) 
govspend 
  
0.0438 -0.0146 
   
(0.87) (-0.29) 
inflation 
  
0.0000329 0.0000330 
   
(1.01) (1.03) 
logphone 
  
0.0246*** 0.0294*** 
   
(14.18) (16.86) 
cl 
  
-0.0122** -0.0117** 
   
(-2.96) (-2.88) 
pr 
  
0.00998** 0.0102*** 
   
(3.27) (3.37) 
open 
  
0.0821*** 0.117*** 
   
(8.53) (12.58) 
credit 
  
0.00168*** 0.00157*** 
   
(12.62) (11.79) 
_cons 0.401*** 0.416*** 0.313*** 0.304*** 
 
(104.06) (95.55) (22.00) (21.70) 
     N 1039 1086 886 886 
See Table 2 for abbreviations. 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 10: Panel regression results for ODA’s impact on the HDI (1-year lag) in Africa, 
1980-2011  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi lag_hdi 
aidpop 0.000334*** 
 
-0.000150** 
 
 
(5.03) 
 
(-2.91) 
 aidgdp 
 
-0.490*** 
 
-0.332*** 
  
(-17.72) 
 
(-15.62) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0235*** -0.00107 
   
(-5.07) (-0.25) 
govspend 
  
0.0320 0.0845 
   
(0.63) (1.87) 
inflation 
  
0.0000350 0.00000739 
   
(1.07) (0.25) 
logphone 
  
0.0269*** 0.0243*** 
   
(15.50) (15.81) 
cl 
  
-0.0126** -0.00994** 
   
(-3.03) (-2.69) 
pr 
  
0.00945** 0.00476 
   
(3.06) (1.72) 
open 
  
0.104*** 0.0958*** 
   
(11.21) (11.77) 
credit 
  
0.00165*** 0.00134*** 
   
(12.17) (10.99) 
_cons 0.395*** 0.467*** 0.312*** 0.340*** 
 
(74.38) (101.25) (21.57) (26.35) 
     N 1033 1031 886 886 
See Table 2 for abbreviations.  
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 11: Panel regression results for FDI and ODA’s impact on the HDI (5-year lag) in 
Africa, 1980-2011  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lag5_hdi lag5_hdi lag5_hdi lag5_hdi 
fdipop 0.000210*** 
 
0.000126***   
  (10.31) 
 
(6.15)   
aidpop -0.0000246 
 
-0.000312***   
  (-0.32) 
 
(-5.36)   
fdigdp 
 
0.194*** 
 
-0.159* 
  
 
(3.75) 
 
(-2.21) 
aidgdp 
 
-0.495*** 
 
-0.311*** 
  
 
(-17.47) 
 
(-13.53) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0174*** 0.00583 
  
  
(-3.50) (1.22) 
govspend 
  
0.112* 0.0970 
  
  
(1.98) (1.92) 
inflation 
  
0.0000286 0.0000105 
  
  
(0.89) (0.36) 
logphone 
  
0.0209*** 0.0218*** 
  
  
(10.58) (11.55) 
cl 
  
-0.0146** -0.00944* 
  
  
(-3.24) (-2.32) 
pr 
  
0.0129*** 0.00750* 
  
  
(3.88) (2.48) 
open 
  
0.0955*** 0.108*** 
  
  
(8.95) (11.57) 
  
   
  
credit 
  
0.00177*** 0.00152*** 
  
  
(12.70) (11.94) 
_cons 0.392*** 0.451*** 0.285*** 0.295*** 
  (70.18) (90.54) (18.47) (21.28) 
N 833 831 726 726 
See Table 2 for abbreviations.  
t statistics in parentheses 
  
  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001   
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Table 12: Panel regression results for FDI and ODA’s impact on the HDI (5-year lag) in 
Low-income countries in Africa, 1980-2011  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lag5_hdi lag5_hdi lag5_hdi lag5_hdi 
fdipop 0.000394** 
 
-0.000173   
  -3.12 
 
(-1.05)   
aidpop -0.000161 
 
-0.000713*** 
  (-1.55) 
 
(-7.02)   
fdigdp 
 
0.0804* 
 
-0.0689 
  
 
-2.27 
 
(-0.91) 
aidgdp 
 
-0.167*** 
 
-0.175*** 
  
 
(-7.68) 
 
(-8.00) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0106* -0.000946 
  
  
(-2.31) (-0.20) 
govspend 
  
0.203** 0.216** 
  
  
-2.77 -3.01 
inflation 
  
0.0000167 0.000015 
  
  
-0.72 -0.67 
logphone 
  
0.0154*** 0.0154*** 
  
  
-7.2 -7.29 
cl 
  
-0.0121** -0.00757 
  
  
(-2.73) (-1.77) 
pr 
  
0.00950** 0.00649* 
  
  
-2.81 -1.99 
  
   
  
open 
  
0.0880*** 0.0643*** 
  
  
-5.05 -4.08 
  
   
  
credit 
  
0.00187*** 0.00164*** 
  
  
-5.58 -5 
_cons 0.317*** 0.340*** 0.258*** 0.254*** 
  -51.97 -69.38 -16.85 -17.19 
N 420 420 353 353 
See Table 2 for abbreviations.  
t statistics in parentheses 
  
  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001   
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Table 13: Panel regression results for FDI and ODA’s impact on the HDI (5-year lag) in 
Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income countries in Africa, 1980-2011 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lag5_hdi lag5_hdi lag5_hdi lag5_hdi 
fdipop 0.000123*** 0.000122*** 
  -7.25 
 
-6.51   
aidpop -0.000023 
 
-0.000190*** 
  (-0.34) 
 
(-3.43)   
fdigdp 
 
0.495*** 
 
-0.111 
  
 
-4.16 
 
(-0.98) 
aidgdp 
 
-0.648*** 
 
-0.403*** 
  
 
(-9.96) 
 
(-6.62) 
debtgdp 
  
-0.0211** 0.00318 
  
  
(-2.71) -0.37 
govspend 
  
-0.0176 -0.0235 
  
  
(-0.30) (-0.39) 
inflation 
  
-0.0000642 0.000165 
  
  
(-0.34) -0.85 
logphone 
  
0.0131*** 0.0154*** 
  
  
-4.79 -5.46 
cl 
  
-0.0276*** -0.0230*** 
  
  
(-4.77) (-3.98) 
pr 
  
0.0165*** 0.0121** 
  
  
-3.97 -2.86 
open 
  
0.0488*** 0.0785*** 
  
  
-4.23 -7.05 
credit 
  
0.00114*** 0.00109*** 
  
  
-8.13 -7.71 
_cons 0.481*** 0.511*** 0.450*** 0.429*** 
  -80.55 -75.95 -20.65 -19.96 
N 413 411 373 373 
See Table 2 for abbreviations.  
t statistics in parentheses 
  
  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001   
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
Table 14: Summary statistics for Low-income Countries in Africa 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Development 
hdi 572 0.3297163 0.0738947 0.174 0.509 
lag_hdi 546 0.3272339 0.0735663 0.174 0.505 
lag5_hdi 445 0.317039 0.0721961 0.174 0.474 
Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance 
fdi 570 1.52E+08 3.42E+08 0.00E+00 2.93E+09 
aid 546 5.14E+08 5.95E+08 22800000 5.42E+09 
pop 546 1.36E+07 1.50E+07 629786 8.29E+07 
fdipop 544 12.24122 27.12239 0 303.8257 
fdigdp 570 0.039516 0.0913394 0 0.9100733 
aidpop 546 46.954 32.83366 2.648311 355.3372 
aidgdp 546 0.1596456 0.1430803 0.0166066 1.470542 
Controls 
debtgdp 571 1.019589 1.443248 0.1080612 18.23434 
govspend 517 0.1390811 0.0547435 0.0204712 0.4595933 
inflation 572 84.11566 1147.9 -27.04865 26762.02 
logphone 532 0.1412719 1.926229 -3.248852 4.481364 
internet 361 1.301405 2.463446 0 14 
open 532 0.5957862 0.2638983 0.1432573 1.78982 
credit 510 13.67712 9.879051 0.6827951 103.6323 
pr 572 5.042832 1.584569 1 7 
cl 572 4.777098 1.273349 2 7 
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Table 15: Summary statistics for Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High income 
countries in Africa 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Development 
hdi 571 0.5091665 0.1073871 0.264 0.775 
lag_hdi 545 0.50658 0.1065494 0.264 0.775 
lag5_hdi 441 0.4956164 0.1018088 0.264 0.77 
Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance 
fdi 571 6.49E+08 1.46E+09 -5.59E+09 1.16E+10 
aid 538 4.99E+08 8.18E+08 5270000 1.14E+10 
pop 546 1.56E+07 2.18E+07 81131 1.58E+08 
fdipop 546 103.5225 276.9312 0 2806.03 
fdigdp 567 0.0368939 0.0511901 -0.0553077 0.5418665 
aidpop 538 61.04907 75.95223 1.3438 688.7694 
aidgdp 536 0.0574785 0.0678726 0.0002703 0.5839215 
Controls 
debtgdp 519 0.6634846 0.5478129 0.0303205 3.384584 
govspend 536 0.1667197 0.0697091 0.022877 0.4295028 
inflation 567 13.85553 26.44418 -33.78553 418.233 
logphone 541 1.729287 1.834624 -1.666786 5.251452 
internet 360 5.236225 8.124359 0 49 
open 552 0.8691673 0.3984764 0.0632034 2.453525 
credit 535 28.26015 26.75494 1.542268 161.9804 
pr 569 4.491213 1.951866 1 7 
cl 569 4.283831 1.521218 1 7 
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